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Port State Control (PSC) is the major global strategy for ﬁghting substandard shipping since the signature of The
Hague Memorandum in 1978. In the last years, the increased volume of trade, the enlarged number of main
international conventions and the highlighted diﬀerences among the various Regimes have posed new
challenges to the modern system of PSC, which may need to ﬁnd its new course.
This paper examines the point of view of key maritime stakeholders with regard to the EU PSC regime. Elite
interviews (n = 14) were conducted with subject matter experts ranging from policy makers, to industry and
seafarers’ representatives. The study aims to determine factors leading to diﬀerence in treatment among EU
Member States. The study concludes that PSC in Europe seems to be the most eﬃcient and reliable of the
regional agreement on PSC. However, some discrepancies during the inspection process and outcome can be
highlighted due to diﬀerences at the inspector and Member State level.

1. Introduction
Since the emergence of the various regional agreements, Port State
Control (PSC) has become a robust and omnipresent reality in the
maritime day-to-day operations, or what Bloor et al. (2006) deﬁne as
an ‘enforcement agency’. On March 2018, the shipping industry will
approach the 40th anniversary of the Amoco Cadiz disaster, which
accelerated the emergence of those agreements for coordinated ship
safety inspections. Accidents such as the Aegean Sea (1992), Braer
(1993), Estonia (1994), Erika (1999) and Prestige (2002), caused a
strong political and public outcry for more stringent regulations
regarding safety of ships and protection of the maritime environment.
In line with this appeal, regional cooperation and coordination for ship
inspections were established and responded to the general belief that
many of the existing ﬂag States were ineﬀective to thoroughly fulﬁl
their obligations on their vessels (Anderson, 1998; Bloor et al., 2006;
Özçayır, 2009; van Leeuwen, 2015).
The Hague Memorandum had been just signed when two weeks
after, the Amoco Cadiz ran aground oﬀ the coasts of France spilling
more than 200,000 t of oil and making clear, out and loud, that
shipping failed in coping with new challenges and, more importantly,
in self-controlling its vessels (Anderson, 1998; Bell, 1993; Mansell,
2009; Özçayır, 2004; Vorbach, 2001). It was at the Ministerial
Conference held in Paris in 1982 that 14 European states conceived

⁎

the ﬁrst regional coordinated system of ship inspections by signing the
Paris Memorandum of Understanding on Port State Control (Paris
MoU) in the attempt to stem the proliferation of substandard shipping.
However, it was not until 1995 that PSC became a European Union
(EU) initiative with the implementation of Directive 1995/21/EC on
PSC which made the Paris MoU system mandatory for EU Member
States (MSs). The Directive represents the predecessor of the current
legislative instrument, in force since 1st of January 2011: Directive
2009/16/EC, as amended by Directive 2013/38/EU.
Since its introduction, the areas of application of PSC have greatly
increased. While enforcement provisions have been included in recent
conventions, such as the Maritime Labour Convention (MLC) or the
Ballast Water Management (BWM) Convention, inspection results are
also widely used to determine Flag State performance resulting in the
compilation of a Black-White and Grey (BWG) list. However, despite
the major eﬀorts, discrepancies in harmonization eﬀorts were found by
diﬀerent studies (Anderson, 2002; Bloor et al., 2006; Cariou et al.,
2009; Hjorth, 2015; Knapp and van de Velden, 2009; Knudsen and
Hassler, 2011; Ravira and Piniella, 2016; Sampson and Bloor, 2007)
asserting that PSC ‘does not have uniform application in all diﬀerent
regions and sometimes not even within the same MoU’ (Özçayır, 2009).
This article does not aim to be a historical review of PSC; it is taken
for granted that the increased use of coordinated and harmonised ship
safety inspection eﬀorts has profoundly impacted the shipping industry
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While the literature has shown that some inconsistencies may be
found in the various regions, this study focuses on those which emerge
within the same region and, speciﬁcally, the EU region. Lastly, this
article aims not only at unrevealing disparities, if any, but also to the
underlying contributory factors.

and increased safety standards (Anderson, 2002; Cariou et al., 2008;
Hare, 1997; Özçayır, 2009; Vorbach, 2001). Rather, the purpose of this
article is to investigate what are the main factors contributing to the
disparities in harmonization among EU MSs by focusing on Directive
2009/16/EC, as amended. According to this objective, ten elite interviews with fourteen key experts in the maritime domain were conducted covering a large spectrum of policy-makers (European
Commission, EMSA, Paris MoU Secretariat), ship-owner representatives (BIMCO, INTERCARGO, INTERTANKO, INTERMANAGER),
classiﬁcation societies representatives (IACS) and seafarers’ representatives (Nautical Institute, CESMA).

3. Methodology
The reported ﬁndings are derived from an interview study designed
to accommodate ten elite interviews with fourteen participants.
3.1. Elite Interviews and purposive sampling

2. Literature review – A glance at the past

An elite interview is a type of interview mainly used in political
science to understand hidden elements of policies and/or legislation by
interviewing high-oﬃcials or people holding a prestigious role in
society (e.g. politicians, civil servants, legislators, etc.) (Boucher
et al., 2013 citing Dexter 1970; Richards, 1996). For this reason ‘elite
interview samples tend to be a lot smaller’ (Richards, 1996). A
purposive sampling was deemed appropriate for this study due to the
narrow research focus and the speciﬁc and unique context/case (Miles
et al., 2013).
The key requisite for the choice of participants was to cover the
wide spectrum of stakeholders involved in PSC. The demographic could
not be presented in this paper and will not be shared to the readers for
conﬁdentiality reasons and due to the high-proﬁle of the interviewees.
All information that could be shared is presented in Table 1.
A semi-structured interview was chosen in order to unveil a broad
amount of themes/areas to be explored during the interview. The
interview guide (Appendix A) was developed and tested with one
representative of the United States Coast Guard with long-standing
experience in PSC inspections and one senior researcher in the area of
communication and sociology. The interview is part of a larger study on
Port State Control. This paper focuses on questions relevant to Section
4 and Section 5 of the Interview Guide in Appendix A.
Prior to the interview, all participants were informed of the average
time for the interview (30–45 min). The interviews started by presenting the overall scope of the study and by providing information on the
participants’ rights. Thereafter, the informants were asked to sign a
consent form and complete the demographics sheet. The interviews
were recorded with permission.

Two of the main reasons to develop regional cooperation for PSC
were undoubtedly the need for sharing information between states
about the safety records of vessels and to avoid that a vessel was
inspected at every port within the same region (Hare, 1997). At the
same time, this was underpinned by providing harmonised rules and
standards for inspection procedures. By setting a common standard,
MoUs’ goal is to avoid unilateral action by Port States which could have
a negative impact on the neighbourhood ports within the same region,
reducing their commercial attractiveness (Molenaar, 2007), and distorting the market (Knapp and Franses, 2007a). In parallel, discrepancies may inﬂuence the outcome of performance measurement such
as the BWG list (Perepelkin et al., 2010), by diﬀering safety records and
targeting factors.
Issues in the harmonization and standardization process have been
identiﬁed since the emergence of the ﬁrst MoUs. While major academic
studies have focused on the legal basis for Port State jurisdiction
(Anderson, 1998; Bang, 2009; Bell, 1993; Keselj, 1999; Molenaar,
2007; Özçayır, 2004; Payoyo, 1994) and the improvement of the
targeting system (Anderson, 2002; Cariou et al., 2009; Cariou and
Wolﬀ, 2015; Degré, 2007, 2008; Sage, 2005), inconsistencies in the
application of PSC were already highlighted by Plaza (1994). In the
study conducted by Sampson and Bloor (2007), the perception of
inconsistencies in inspection practices between diﬀerent countries in
diﬀerent MoUs emerged during stakeholders interviews and ﬁeld
studies. Diﬀerences in treatment were also underlined by Knapp and
van de Velden (2009) and Knudsen and Hassler (2011), which
concluded that a degree of harmonization and uniformity across the
various PSC MoUs is far from being reached. Nevertheless, studies
targeting inconsistencies within the same region are scarce (e.g., Cariou
et al., 2009) and none of those regard the EU as their main focus.
Özçayır (2009) was concerned by the lack of uniform application of
inspection standards. The author suggested that if, on the one hand,
insuﬃcient funds and lack of personnel are the main contributors for
diﬀerences among states, the subjectivity of PSC Oﬃcers (PSCO) for
detaining vessels on the basis of their professional judgment represents
a major drawback rooted in their background and training. This aspect
of discretion in PSCOs is re-evoked and reinforced by Bloor et al.
(2006) in the results of an ethnographic-inspired study which involved
3 maritime authorities, more than one hundred observations on board
and around 30 interviews with key stakeholders. In their study on
cross-national (rather than within-national) diﬀerences in inspection
practices, the background of the inspector emerged as one contributing
factor.
Following the stream of PSCO's background and training, Knapp
and Franses (2007b) suggested that the probability of detention
appears to be slightly higher if the inspection is conducted by an
inspector with engineering background compared to nautical background. Similarly, Ravira and Piniella (2016) analysed the inﬂuence of
the professional background of PSCOs within the framework of the
Spanish Administration. The authors concluded that both professional
background and the use or lack of teams for the conduction of an
inspection has an inﬂuence on the inspection outcome.

3.2. Critical case study
The focus of this paper on the Paris MoU lies in the peculiar nature
of the regime which makes it arguably a ‘critical case’ scenario
(Goldthorpe, 1968). In their study on whether empirical evidence
would support the emergence of the notion of embourgeoisement, the
Table 1
Elites participating in the interviews, their Organization and Background.
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Participant ID

Organization

Background

P1
P2
P3
P4
P5
P6
P7
P8
P9
P10
P11
P12
P13
P14

European Commission
EMSA
EMSA
BIMCO
INTERTANKO
IACS
INTERMANAGER
NAUTICAL INSTITUTE
INTERCARGO
CESMA
Paris MoU Secretariat
Paris MoU Secretariat
CESMA
CESMA

Law
Master Mariner & PSCO
Other & PSCO
Master Mariner
Master Mariner
Naval Architecture
Master Mariner
Master Mariner
Naval Architecture
Master Mariner
Master Mariner
Master Mariner
Master Mariner
Master Mariner
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credibility, transferability, dependability and conﬁrmability (Trochim
and Donnelly, 2006). For this purpose, an analytical triangulation has
been conducted through a review by inquiry participants and an
independent expert audit review (n = 3).

authors designed the most favourable setting. They argued that should
embourgeoisement not be found in the most favourable setting, it
would be safe to say that it would be unlikely to occur in less-favourable
settings. In other words ‘if it happens here, it will happen anywhere’ or
‘if it doesn’t happen here, it won’t happen anywhere’ (Patton, 2015; p.
275).
Similarly, the nature of the Paris MoU itself suggests that the
regime constitutes a critical case study for four main reasons:

4. Results & discussion
The following section provides the results and discussion of this
study with a focus on the challenges/discrepancies that can be found in
the Paris MoU regime. In the original template (Table 2), the a priori
code “Challenges/Discrepancies” was changed into “Challenges/
Discrepancies Paris MoU” to distinguish the Paris MoU from the other
regions of the World. However, the “Challenges/Discrepancies” highlighted for other MOUs have not been included in this paper as well as
other clusters such as “Background History”, “Eﬀectiveness of PSC”
and “Areas of Improvement” because it is not in the scope of this
article.

1. Since the Paris MoU is the ﬁrst regional agreement on PSC signed in
1982, the level of experience and maturity is higher than other more
recently signed MoUs.
2. While MoUs are, ipso facto, gentlemen's agreements, the Paris MoU
is supported by the EU Directive 2009/16/EC as amended, which is
legally binding for all the EU MSs.
3. Lastly, the Paris MoU beneﬁts from a set of tools such as a targeting
database system (THETIS), an online distance-learning programme
(DLP), an inspection support software (RuleCheck) and others,
which have only recently been adopted by some other MoUs.
4. All other MoU's have observer status in the Paris MoU meetings and
trainings, and routinely receive for information all Instructions,
Guidelines and other information. Although these arrangements are
reciprocal, they are highly conducive to the dissemination of the
Paris MoU way of working.

4.1. An overview of discrepancies and challenges in the European
Union region
Fig. 1 shows the main themes and how often certain codes can be
found in the interviews’ transcriptions. The more often the code has
been assigned to a participant, the larger the square. The size of a single
square is determined by its relation to all other squares in the matrix
and gives a general overview of the distribution of the segments for all
codes and participants (the ﬁgure can be read both vertically and
horizontally).
Contrarily, Fig. 2 illustrates the distribution of the codes for the
individual participant (the ﬁgure must be read vertically) which
indicates for every participant (P stands for participant) which were
the most used codes and the size of the square is compared to the other
squares in the same column. (confusing)
In general, the software counts how many times a code has been
used, regardless of the length of the sentence and number of words.
This means that the following two quotes are both regarded as one
code:

For these four main reasons, it is presumed that if discrepancies can
be found in the Paris MoU regime, it is likely that those can be found in
more recent MOUs.
3.3. Data analysis
All audio-recordings were verbatim transcribed and anonymized.
All collected data and transcriptions were entered in MAXQDA 10
software and analysed using template analysis.
In essence, the method structures the collected data through data
coding aiming at identifying the main themes of the study. This method
works well in studies where a comparison between diﬀerent groups
within a speciﬁc context is performed (Patton, 2015). The term
‘template analysis’, however, does not refer to a clear and uniquely
identiﬁable method but rather a ‘group of techniques for thematically
organizing and analysing textual data’ (King, 2004). It suggests
identifying some a priori codes which then will be modiﬁed and
updated through in vivo codes during the analysis.
Since the study follows a deductive-inspired approach, the analysis
did not begin with a tabula rasa, but with a set of pre-deﬁned
categories or codes, known as template (Table 2). They were later
reﬁned and revised with the in vivo codes. An extract is shown in
Appendix B and pertains to Section 4 and Section 5 of the interview.
The a priori codes were derived from previous literature and were
discussed with three experienced Port State Control Oﬃcers (PSCOs).
Given the pragmatic approach underpinning the research philosophy of this study and the intended recipients of the ﬁndings, the
authors adopted an output oriented approach (Patton, 2015; Reynolds
et al., 2011) to determine the quality of the ﬁndings in terms of

“I think they made a huge diﬀerence. And it would be very wrong to
not accept that. They ach-achieved something which is maybe more
important for me. There is a standardization, there is cooperation,
there is a body where we can lodge our complain, where we can have
a discussion. It's not arbitrary like it was ‘you can’t-you can’t talk to
me, I am guru and I know what I am talking about’. So they
deﬁnitely achieved that. By doing that, if you look at the safety
record of shipping industry it's bloody excellent. And compare us
with air industry and you would be surprised. We are really, really
good and Port State Control must be congratulated on that.”
(INTERMANAGER)
And:
“Some countries ahem have an elaborate system which requires that
the Port State Control Oﬃcer almost ﬁnishes like ahem a university
degree in Port State Control before Master's Degree before he's
allowed to work as a Port State Control Oﬃcer.” (EMSA)
This is because the objective of the visualization is to show how
often a certain topic has been discussed by the participants, regardless
of the size of the sentence.
The two ﬁgures are divided according to their stakeholder group:
Policy Makers (P1 – P2 – P3 – P11 – P12), Seafarers representatives
(P10 – P13 – P14 – P8 – P7), Industry's representatives (P7 – P4 – P5
– P9 – P6). Due to the current active role of P7 in two stakeholder
groups, the participant has been included in both seafarers and shipowners’ representative groups.
As shown in Fig. 1, Participants 2 and 7 were the most active in
highlighting discrepancies in Europe, mainly focusing their attention

Table 2
A priori codes used for the data analysis.
1st level code

2nd Level code

Background history
Challenges/Discrepancies

N/A
Background of PSCOs
Inspection procedures
Detention Criteria
Training of PSCOs
N/A
N/A

Eﬀectiveness of PSC
Areas of improvement
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Fig. 1. Discrepancies and Challenges in the EU region (overall).

get away with issues (.) detected and all, where they should not. And
in the past would not have gone away with it, so (ahem) the
inspectors have become more relaxed to dealing with problems”
(EMSA).

on Background of PSCOs, Diﬀerences between MSs, MSs level and
Training of the PSCOs; the results of both participants alone represent
31% of the overall coded segments. An outcome which might suggest
that these actors are particularly involved in these themes. In addition,
the most frequently discussed themes among the participants were:
Attitude/Approach on board, Background of PSCOs, Diﬀerence between MSs and Training of PSCOs.
In general, policy makers were the most active group in focusing on
the discrepancies in the regime. This might be a consequence of the
availability of non-public information they have access to through the
management of the regional PSC database THETIS, by training PSCOs
and by conducting visits to the various MSs on the implementation of
the PSC Directive. Topics such as Training of the PSCOs, Team/No
Team on board and the inﬂuence at the MSs level (e.g. resources,
national or local legislation, etc.) were thoroughly addressed by policy
makers while the same cannot be said for other stakeholders. This is
also why the former tend to have a more critical approach towards the
harmonization and uniformity of the MoU while industry (with the
exception of INTERMANAGER) and seafarers had a very positive
attitude towards the Paris MoU and its equal treatment. An outcome
which was interpreted by one of the participants as an outcome of the
regime's reputation:

Fig. 3 organizes the ﬁndings in a brief diagram where the three
main clusters found are summarised in: Inspector Level, MS Level
and Diﬀerences Among MSs. While the details of the ﬁndings will
be further explained in the next sections, it is crucial to conceptualise
the meaning of the ﬁgure. The two clusters on top of the ﬁgure (input),
namely Inspector Level and MS Level, encompass the main factors
identiﬁed by the interviewees which could lead to discrepancies during
a Ship Inspection. Conversely, the bottom of the ﬁgure, namely
Diﬀerences Among MSs, illustrates the output of a PSC inspection
where the two clusters on top had a negative inﬂuence on the
inspection process (output).
4.2. Member states level
At the MS level the participants have highlighted some factors, or
better, local factors, which could negatively inﬂuence a PSC inspection.
Those are:

•
•
•
•
•
•

“I think the Paris MoU still today is regarded as the most eﬀective
region which I think it's not the case. What we have created is an
area around us, a maritime area, where there is a big a high level of
self-control by shipping companies, by ﬂag States, by ships in
general. Because of the reputation of the Paris MoU. So that is the
indirect eﬀectivity, you have created a name for yourself and we still
use that reputation […] So (ahem) to say it in normal words (.) ships

Use of Teams on Board
Resources (Human & Financial)
Local/National Legislation
Training of PSCOs
Internal Administrative Structure
Political Inﬂuence/Support

Fig. 2. Discrepancies and Challenges in the EU Region (participants).
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Fig. 3. Input and Output of a discretionary ship inspection system.

country (ﬁnancial and human resources), by the internal organization
of the country, the distance between ports, the presence or absence of
regional PSC oﬃces, among others.

Some of those local diﬀerences were already suggested by Plaza
(1994) and further by Bloor et al. (2006) and Knudsen and Hassler
(2011).
Among the various legal acts through which the EU achieves its
goals, Directives and Regulations are the most common. While both
legislative acts are binding for the EU MSs, the level of ﬂexibility
changes greatly. A Directive sets out a goal or result that then the
individual MS is still free to choose how to pursue its implementation
through transposition into national legislation. Conversely, a
Regulation must be applied entirely into national legislation throughout the union without further transposition (Coleman and Jessen,
2016). In other words, a Directive ensures a higher degree of ﬂexibility
for MSs which may leave wide gaps in the implementation process
(Falkner et al., 2004). It is therefore assumed that the choice of
enacting common PSC procedures by means of Directive 2009/16/EC,
as amended, represents the origin of part of the highlighted disparities
in the implementation and enforcement eﬀorts. This has also been
highlighted by some of the policy makers during the interview study.
Since
Resources,
Local/National
Legislation,
Internal
Administrative Structure and Political Inﬂuence/Support have mainly
been discussed in relation to Training of PSCOs and Use of Teams on
Board, those two factors are explored in more detail in the following
sections.

“[…] in some countries it depends on the distance to travel. You
send one person in a car for four hours or do you send two?” (Paris
MoU Secretariat).
With regard to the travelling distance that needs to be covered by
the PSCO to inspect a vessel, some participants suggested to investigate
the existence of a travelling policy within the country compared to the
miles of coastline or the travelling time from one port to another
compared to the miles of coastline.
It seemed clear that inspections conducted in isolation do not only
accentuate the cultural and/or background diﬀerences, but leave the
subject exposed to the ship's crew and the shipowner. The use of a team
dims the eﬀects of external pressure on the inspectors while allowing
for interaction between the team members (peer review and complementary expertise). This interaction tends to mitigate negative eﬀects
connected to the use of professional judgment in uncertain/unclear
situations.

4.2.2. A (non-)harmonised training policy
Same as for the decision to make use of teams for PSC inspections,
the training of PSCO is a national prerogative. In their annexes, the
PSC Directive (Annex XI) and the Paris MoU text (Annex VI) determine
the professional proﬁle of the inspectors and establish the so-called
“minimum criteria” for PSCO. Those criteria, such as having an
appropriate qualiﬁcation from a nautical institution and having
completed a minimum of one year of service as a ﬂag State inspector,
have become mandatory for EU MSs so that PSCO would have
appropriate theoretical knowledge and practical experience of ships
and their operation. While the Directive establishes the minimum
criteria, the Paris MoU has developed the Paris MoU Policy on the
training of the new entrant PSC Oﬃcers and the professional
development scheme for PSC Oﬃcers which establishes a convergent
training policy for both new and experienced PSCOs. Although this

4.2.1. The use of teams – an issue of resources?
The use of teams of PSC oﬃcers on board to perform a PSC
inspection was indicated as a factor that could lead to diﬀerent
inspection outcomes compared to single PSCO inspections. Knapp
and Franses (2007b) suggested that the inspector background is
reﬂected in particular deﬁciencies while Ravira and Piniella (2016)
strongly advocate for multidisciplinary team on board. However, some
participants from the policy making group have highlighted that the
decision of using teams of two or more inspectors is not part of the EU
legislation and therefore is a decision of the MS whether to avail of one
or more PSCOs during a single inspection (P11-P12-P2-P3). This
decision is strongly inﬂuenced by the availability of resources of the
5
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4.3.1. Professional judgment
Discretion, subjectivity, individuality, professional judgment and
other equivalent concepts have broadly been interpreted as one of the
circumstances leading to diﬀerence in treatment across countries and
ports (Bloor et al., 2006; Özçayır, 2009; Sampson and Bloor, 2007).
The deﬁnition suggested by Coles (2002) states that professional
judgment is exercised when a practitioner, in this case the PSCO,
makes judgment calls in an uncertain situation. The text of the Annex I
of the Paris MoU itself states that:

policy determines a thorough professional development scheme and a
syllabus, it neither speciﬁes how to conduct the training nor the
number of hours necessary to accommodate the various elements of
the policy. As pointed out by several policy makers, the implementation
of the training policy is still a national responsibility and cannot be
enforced by the EC. It is not included in the text of the Directive, which
would make it legally binding.
“What training is implemented nationally? Because actually on a
national level we don’t really know how they do it. It's their
responsibility […] Let's say on the other side as soon as they are
port state control oﬃcer from that moment on they become either a
new entrant in our training policy or they are the experienced
PSCOs and they go for the professional development scheme. That's
all laid out, what are the requirements, what are the minimum
standards, what is the material (ahem) so that's let's say something
that we are much better able to monitor” (Paris MoU Secretariat)

“The Port State Control Oﬃcer will (…) use his professional
judgement in deciding whether and in what respects the ship will
be further inspected” (Paris MoU, 2017)
and also, in the PSC Committee instructions on “Guidance on
Detention and Action Taken”:
“The PSCO will exercise professional judgment in determining
whether to detain the ship until the deﬁciencies are rectiﬁed or to
allow it to sail with certain deﬁciencies without unreasonable
danger to the safety, health, or the environment, having regard to
the particular circumstances of the intended voyage” (Paris MoU,
2016)

According to the group of the Policy Makers, the participants were
almost unanimous in suggesting that training procedures among EU
MSs are not harmonised. Some considered the training policy of the
diﬀerent MSs as a ‘black hole’ (P1), while others made a clear-cut
diﬀerence between those countries with developed training schemes
and those with a ‘training on the job’ policy:

Some participants have expressed severe criticisms on the overreliance on expert judgment which inherently does not contribute to
the harmonization process. Others, such as some industry and seafarers’ representatives, seem to appreciate the ﬂexibility which would
not be achievable if other strategies would be applied (e.g. checklists,
etc.).
Overall, two main issues can be raised. Firstly, professional judgment may undermine the main objective set by Directive 2009/16/EC,
as amended, which is to enforce rules and standards of international
applicable conventions. Allowing for subjectivity can cause inconsistencies in decision outcomes (Hawkins, 1992 as cited in Bloor et al.,
2006). Secondly, the exercise of professional judgment implies that the
PSCO must be a professional. The existence of minimum criteria for
PSCO has already been clariﬁed above. However, inconsistencies in the
training policy of MSs and diﬀerent professional backgrounds may
aﬀect the level of professionalism matured by the PSCO.
Several factors may inﬂuence expert judgment: prejudices, cultural
attitude, professional background, training, ego, personal opinions
among others (P1 – P2 – P3 – P6 – P7 – P8 – P9 – P11 – P12 –
P13). Some of these factors, for example, were identiﬁed also in a study
conducted by Carter (2006) on the variance of police behaviours.
Taking into consideration the input provided by the participants, a
mitigation could be achieved by means of a soft or hard approach. The
soft approach focuses on harmonising the training policy pertaining
inspection procedures, detention criteria and convention requirements.
Conversely, the hard approach would suggest more prescriptive
procedures and, ultimately, the use of checklists during inspections.

“Some countries (ahem) have an elaborate system which requires
that the Port State Control Oﬃcer almost ﬁnishes like (ahem) a
university degree in Port State Control before Master's Degree
before he's allowed to work as a Port State Control Oﬃcer […] there
are other countries where they hire a new guy who is then left alone
from day one. And only has to call back to the oﬃce when he has a
problem. Which is a massive diﬀerence of course and this is then
(ahem) visible in inspection results, it is visible in reactions of
companies towards inspection and it's damaging or not to the
reputation of the organization, the Paris MoU in general or the MoU
in general” (EMSA)
However, with other stakeholders, with the exception of
INTERMANAGER and IACS, the topic of training was rarely mentioned.
The participants convened that a harmonised training policy is the
most eﬀective tool to ensure common treatment. In fact, it was
suggested that the national attitude towards training has a deep impact
on the way PSCO approach their job, what methodology they learn and
apply, what knowledge of the relevant conventions they have, etc. In
order to develop a comprehensive picture of the training commitment
of the various MSs, the total number of training hours (both desk and
practical training) per person, provided to new and existing personnel,
should be investigated through the reports compiled by EMSA at the
end of the visits to MSs investigating the implementation and enforcement of Directive 2009/16/EC, as amended.

4.3.2. Background of the PSCOs
The background of the inspector has dominated the discussion in
all interviews. It seemed clear that whether nautical, engineering or
naval architecture, the background has a leading role not only in
determining the outcome of the inspection itself (e.g. detaining or not
the vessel, type of deﬁciencies found, etc.), but sometimes even on the
attitude and approach on board. As a criterion, it was pointed out that
since an engineer ﬁnds himself/herself more comfortable in the Engine
Room as well as a Captain ﬁnds himself/herself more comfortable on
the Bridge, the inspections and eventual deﬁciencies would reﬂect their
proﬁciency in these arenas:

4.3. Inspector level
The second main cluster of codes, which summarizes some of the
circumstances that may determine discrepancies in the output of the
inspection process, entails the inspector level. In detail:

•
•
•
•

Background of the PSCOs
Cultural inﬂuence
Professional Judgment
Attitude/Approach on Board

“You’ve done 30 years as a deck oﬃcer therefore your Port State
Control is always limited to an inspection of the bridge. You’re never
going to the Engine Room” (IACS)

Since Cultural inﬂuence, and Attitude/Approach on board have
mainly been discussed in relation to the Professional Judgment and
Background of the PSCO, these two factors will be explored with more
detail in the following sections.

Or also:
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“[…] if you are if you are, say, you are technical background. Your
comfort zone is engine room. Ok? So our so you-the tendency is if I
am a ships ‘captain, as a Port State Control I’ll tend to spend more
time on the bridge because I know what hole I can ﬁnd wrong. The
opposite can happen if you’re engineer you will spend more time in
the engine room. If you’re a naval architect, you might spend more
time on the structural issues rather than (ahem) the operational
issues related to… and not more on navigation. He will might look
into the ship structure and the (ahem) the steel work et cetera.”
(NAUTICAL INSTITUTE)

PSC in Northern countries has been considered more robust in
terms of maritime knowledge since PSCOs are generally ex-seafarers.
However, a structured approach towards procedures seems challenging
to be achieved. The consequence is that the perception of quality is
higher for seafarers and industry (P4-P7) but not for policy makers.
Conversely, in Southern countries, the subjectivity of the inspectors
and the lack of seafaring experience may play a larger role in the
conduction of inspections. However, whereas seafaring knowledge may
be lacking, adherence to structured procedure seems easier to achieve.
This way, the perception of quality seems higher for policy makers but
not for seafarers and industry.

This issue could be avoided by sending two inspectors with diﬀerent
background to perform a PSC inspection. It seemed clear that if the
inspection would be conducted by an individual (and not a team) with
one of the background mentioned above, the type of deﬁciencies and/or
the areas visited on board could be the result of their professional skills
developed before becoming a PSCO. Conversely, inspectors lacking a
seafaring background have the tendency to conduct the inspection by
the rules, having less technical and operational knowledge (P2-P4-P13P8) yet a very good knowledge of the inspection procedures of their
MoU (P2-P3).
Following the discussion on the background, a diﬀerence in
approaches and attitudes has been underlined. Experts have indicated
that ex-seafarers seem to be more indulgent towards the ship and the
crew; it is easier to “get away with deﬁciencies” (P4). This might be
explained by being more empathetic with the crew and by believing in
the skills and the capability of the crew to ﬁx deﬁciencies on their own
(P2). To summarize, two inspection approaches have been identiﬁed:
the ﬁrst is where the PSCO on board tends to determine whether the
vessel is safe to sail (approach more related to PSCOs with a seafaring
background), while the second is to ﬁnd deﬁciencies strictly following
guidelines and procedures (approach more related to PSCOs lacking
seafaring background, P2-P4-P8-P7-P6). However, this diﬀerent perception may suggest that PSC has diﬀerent perceived objectives
according to the group of stakeholders dealing with it. Policy Makers
seem to aim at ﬁnding substandard ships and increase the safety
standard of the vessels sailing across EU waters by using common
procedures which is in line with the rationale of the Directive, IMO
Resolutions and the MoU text. Contrariwise, ship-owners seemed
keener on targeting issues and in making sure that the general
demeanour of PSCOs was to verify the seaworthiness of the vessel
rather than compliance with the international legislation. While this
approach may seem more reasonable, it does not take into consideration the main objective of PSC: determining compliance of vessels with
applicable international rules and standards.

4.5. Quality of the research
In recent years, some authors have suggested that validity, reliability, objectivity and generalisability may not be the best suitable
criteria to evaluate qualitative inquiries (Hammersley, 2007; Hoepﬂ,
1997; Patton, 2015; Yilmaz, 2013). For this reason, alternative criteria
such as those of credibility, dependability, conﬁrmability and transferability were initially developed by Guba and Lincoln (1989) and
adopted for this study. The overall work was subject to an analytical
triangulation conducted through a review by inquiry participants an
independent audit review (n = 3).
In detail, to establish high level of credibility, the manuscript was
submitted to three independent experts which evaluated the methodology and the quality of the ﬁndings. At the same time, to determine
conﬁrmability, the manuscript was submitted to the 14 participants to
collect their views and potential post-comments in the paper discussion. Dependability was achieved through a code-recode procedure
throughout the analysis of the data after waiting at least two weeks
from the initial coding. Lastly, to provide transferability, thorough
information regarding the participants, the context and the methods
employed are illustrated to the reader.
4.6. Limitations and future perspectives
It should be noted that this paper has been primarily focused on the
identiﬁcation of discrepancies and challenges (if any) in the Paris MoU
region, targeting EU countries only, and does not address other areas
explored during the interview study.
Although the use of elite interviews is highly beneﬁcial to gain
insights into the decision-making process, to provide information nonrecorded in oﬃcial reports and to shed light on hidden elements in the
area under investigation (Richards, 1996), the results can be aﬀected
by biases. Overall, issues of accessibility of the participants and the
power relationship between interviewer and interviewee may shape the
data and the reliability of the data collected (Boucher et al., 2013).
While no accessibility issues were reported in the study, Berry (2002)
suggests that the most eﬃcient way to steer the conversation is for the
interviewer to become an expert in the subject; experience which is
covered by the authors of this paper. Moreover, the authors favoured
semi-structure interviews instead of fully open-ended interviews (as
generally suggested for elite interviews) to ensure a higher degree of
transferability and dependability.
The ﬁndings of this study are restricted to individuals/experts
which have a broad knowledge of the topic under investigation and also
hold a position of prestige in the hierarchy of the contacted agency,
entity, company or association. This also suggests that due to their
public/private roles, the participants may have refrained to give strong
statements and opinions. It is suggested for future studies to expand
the scope of the study to other subject-related experts such as PSCOs,
Administrators and multiple seafarers. In addition, it must be taken
into consideration that the participants may have wanted to cover only
some issues rather than others by focusing their attention on topics
they are more involved into.
On a higher level, since EU policy makers are embarking on the

4.4. Diﬀerences between EU member states. Diverse structure and
knowledge towards a north-south slope?
While the legal texts of the diﬀerent MoUs are virtually identical,
the enforcement of these provisions may change due to ﬁnancial
resources, training capabilities and/or infrastructures (Bang and
Jang, 2012; Knudsen and Hassler, 2011; Plaza, 1994). Shipowners’
and seafarers’ representatives were almost unanimous in deﬁning the
Paris MoU as the best PSC regime where discrepancies are infrequent.
However, slight diﬀerences between EU MSs have been highlighted
(Sampson and Bloor, 2007); this is true especially when the debate
pertains southern and northern countries in what has been called
‘north-south slope’ (P2). Some participants, such as P4-P2-P6-P7, have
portrayed the southern countries of Europe as the keenest on detaining
ships while in the north of Europe, MSs tend to perform an inspection
‘less by the rules’:
“Let me say that the barrier for where you are detained is less in the
South and higher in the North. In the North, you can in more cases
talk your way out of it” (P4 - BIMCO).
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revision of the relevant legal framework, the ﬁndings of this article may
highlight areas needful of amendments for a new Directive on PSC and
steer the regime towards a new course.

diﬀerences identiﬁed. Above all, advocating for a single training policy
for PSCOs, multidisciplinary teams on board and more structured
inspection procedures appeared the main mitigation approaches
suggested by the participants. In addition, it is our belief that the
introduction of a diﬀerent legal system, such as a Regulation, would
prevent transposition and application concerns and favour harmonization. The authors hope that this study and its ﬁndings can contribute to
the corpus of reference materials that will inform EU policymakers as
they embark on a recast of the relevant legal framework. An initiative
which could represent a new point of departure for EU Port State
Control.

5. Conclusions
The body of literature dealing with PSC in the last years has greatly
focused on demonstrating whether diﬀerences in treatment would exist
among MoUs. However, few studies have discussed whether diﬀerences
appear within the same MoU. This article complements other scientiﬁc
work by highlighting the main factors leading to diﬀerences in
approach at the inspector and MS level in the EU region.
According to the results, it is fair to say that the Paris MoU appears
the most eﬀective and reliable of the regional agreement on PSC. This is
true especially for seafarers’ and shipowners’ representatives while
policy makers maintain a more neutral assessment.
Nonetheless, a diﬀerence in maritime knowledge and structure of
the inspection process was identiﬁed between Northern and Southern
EU countries. PSCOs from the former group of countries tend to have a
thorough maritime knowledge due to their professional background.
Still, they lack a structured ship inspection approach due to overreliance on experience and expertise. On the contrary, PSCOs from the
latter group of countries seem to rely more on a structured ship
inspection approach due to their lack of seafaring experience.
Despite the positive achievements reached in 40 years of coordinated PSC by the EU, some strategies were suggested to overcome the
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Appendix A. Interview guide
General objective: What is the perception of PSC among diverse actors within the maritime domain?
1. Demographic:

•
•
•
•
•

What is your age?
What is your nationality?
What is your current position/occupation?
What training/qualiﬁcations do you have that are of relevance to your current position or occupation? (e.g. Master degree, etc.)
How long have you worked in this position or occupation?

2. Inquiry about the participant's general perception on Port State Control, covering objectives and eﬀectiveness:

•
•

When discussing about PSC regimes, how would you deﬁne their primary goals/objectives?
What aspects would make you consider eﬀective a PSC regime?

3. Inquiry about the challenges/diﬀerences, if any, among PSC regimes across the World. Determine in what aspects and what factors:

•
•

Do you believe diﬀerences exist among PSC regimes across the World?
Follow up with probing questions such as “in what aspects?” – “what factors would inﬂuence these aspects?”

4. Inquiry about PSC in the European Union. Determine the general evaluation of the PSC regime and what aspects and/or factors would
determine challenges/diﬀerences in the current regime:

•
•
•
•
•
•
•

How do you evaluate the overall PSC regime in Europe in reaching its objectives?
How would you consider the application of PSC in Europe in light of consistency?
According to your professional experience, in what aspects PSC is applied less/more consistently?
What factors would inﬂuence these aspects?
Do you think that the inspector background could inﬂuence the inspection outcome? In what way?
Do you think that the inspector training could inﬂuence the inspection outcome? In what way?
How would you evaluate the detention criteria across Europe?

5. Inquiry about what would be needed to be changed in the current PSC Regime in Europe.

•

What aspects would you modify in the current PSC regime in Europe?
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General probing questions used in the study:

•
•
•
•
•
•

Could you elaborate more on that?
What could be the inﬂuencing conditions?
What do you mean by […]?
I’d like to hear more about […]?
May I ask you to think back and elaborate more on that?
According to your professional experience […]

Appendix B. Extract of the ﬁnal template

1st level code

2nd Level code

3rd Level code

Challenges/Discrepancies in Europe

Inspector Level

Professional Judgment (subjectivity)
Cultural Inﬂuence
Background of PSCOs
Attitude/Approach on board
Inspection Outcome/Detention criteria
Inspection procedures
Use of teams on board
Training of PSCOs
Political inﬂuence and/or support
Internal Administrative Structure
Resources
National or Local Legislation

Diﬀerence between MSs
MSs Level

Comp. Law 26 (3), 571–594.
Hjorth, F., 2015. Complexity and ambivalence in ship safety inspection - the view of
Swedish port state control oﬃcers. Växjö: Linna. Univ. Press, 2015.
Hoepﬂ, M.C., 1997. Choosing qualitative research: a primer for technology education
researchers. J. Technol. Educ. 9 (1), 47–63.
Keselj, T., 1999. Port state jurisdiction in respect of pollution from ships: the 1982
United Nations Convention on the law of the Sea and the memoranda of
understanding. Ocean Dev. Int. Law 30 (2), 127–160.
King, N., 2004. Using templates in the thematic analysis of text. In: Cassell, C., Symon, G.
(Eds.), Essential Guide to Qualitative Methods in Organizational Research. SAGE
Publications Ltd, London, 256–270.
Knapp, S., Franses, P.H., 2007a. Econometric analysis on the eﬀect of port state control
inspections on the probability of casualty. Mar. Policy 31, 550–563.
Knapp, S., Franses, P.H., 2007b. A global view on port state control: econometric analysis
of the diﬀerences across port state control regimes. Marit. Policy Manag. 34,
453–482.
Knapp, S., van de Velden, M., 2009. Visualization of diﬀerences in treatment of safety
inspections across port state control regimes: a case for increased harmonization
eﬀorts. Transp. Rev. 29, 499–514.
Knudsen, O.F., Hassler, B., 2011. IMO legislation and its implementation: accident risk,
vessel deﬁciencies and national administrative practices. Mar. Policy 35, 201–207.
Mansell, J.N.K., 2009. Flag State Responsibility: Historical Development and
Contemporary Issues. Springer, Heidelberg.
Miles, M.B., Huberman, A.M., Saldaña, J., 2013. Qualitative Data Analysis: A Methods
Sourcebook. SAGE Publications.
Molenaar, E.J., 2007. Port state Jurisdiction: toward comprehensive, mandatory and
Global coverage. Ocean Dev. Int. Law 38 (1–2), 225–257.
Özçayır, O., 2004. Port State Control 2nd ed. LLP, London.
Özçayır, O., 2009. The use of port state control in maritime industry and application of
the Paris MoU. Ocean Coast. Law J. 14 (2), 201–239.
Paris MoU, 2016. Guidance on Detention and Action Taken, Port State Control
Committee Instruction 49/2016/08REV. Secretariat Paris MoU on PSC, The Hague,
The Netherlands.
Paris MoU, 2017. Paris Memorandum of Port State Control 40th Amendment.
Secretariat Paris MoU on PSC, The Hague, The Netherlands.
Patton, M.Q., 2015. Qualitative Research & Evaluation Methods: Integrating Theory and
Practice 4th ed. SAGE Pulibcations, Inc, Thousand Oaks, California.
Payoyo, P.B., 1994. Implementation of international conventions through port state
control: an assessment. Mar. Policy 18, 379–392.
Perepelkin, M., Knapp, S., Perepelkin, G., de Pooter, M., 2010. An improved
methodology to measure ﬂag performance for the shipping industry. Mar. Policy 34,
395–405.
Plaza, F., 1994. Port state control: towards Global Standardisation. Marit. Stud. 1994
(75), 28–34.
Ravira, F.J., Piniella, F., 2016. Evaluating the impact of PSC inspectors' professional
proﬁle: a case study of the Spanish Maritime Administration. WMU J. Marit. Aﬀ.,
1–16.
Reynolds, J., Kizito, J., Ezumah, N., Mangesho, P., Allen, E., Chandler, C., 2011. Quality
assurance of qualitative research: a review of the discourse. Health Res. Policy Syst.
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